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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Charles Mack is a Muslim inmate who claims that he 
was terminated from his paid work assignment for 
complaining to a prison official about two correctional 
officers’ anti-Muslim harassment at work.  He also claims 
that the same officers’ harassment had caused him to refrain 
from praying while at work.  Mack brought this lawsuit pro 
se against various prison employees seeking monetary relief 
for alleged violations of his rights under the First 
Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and the Religious Freedom 
and Restoration Act (“RFRA”).  The District Court dismissed 
all of Mack’s claims.  
 
 Mack’s allegations raise several issues of first 
impression in our Circuit, including (1) whether an inmate’s 
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oral grievance to prison officials can constitute protected 
activity under the Constitution; (2) whether RFRA prohibits 
individual conduct that substantially burdens religious 
exercise; and (3) whether RFRA provides for monetary relief 
from an official sued in his individual capacity.  We answer 
all three questions in the affirmative, and therefore conclude 
that Mack has sufficiently pled a First Amendment retaliation 
claim and a RFRA claim.  We agree, however, that Mack’s 
First Amendment Free Exercise claim and Fifth Amendment 
equal protection claim must be dismissed.  We will therefore 
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the District Court 
for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 A. Mack’s Allegations of Anti-Muslim 
Harassment 
 
 Mack’s pro se complaint includes the following 
allegations, which we assume are true for purposes of this 
appeal.2  Mack is an inmate at the Federal Correctional 
Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania (“FCI Loretto”).  He 
worked for pay in the prison’s commissary from 
approximately May 2009 until he was terminated in October 
                                              
2 Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 190 n.11 
(3d Cir. 2016).  Because Mack proceeded pro se up until this 
appeal, we will also consider his allegations made in response 
to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, which incorporate and 
are consistent with the allegations in his complaint.  See 
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n.8 (1980) (per curiam) 
(considering pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint and 
response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss to conclude that 
plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim). 
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2009.  His job responsibilities included stocking shelves, 
filling inmate commissary orders, and cleaning the work area.  
As a practicing Muslim, Mack was provided certain religious 
accommodations at work.  For example, Mack did not have to 
handle pork products at the commissary, he was provided a 
suitable area in which he could pray during breaks, and he 
was permitted to attend religious services on Friday.3  
Defendants Doug Roberts and Samuel Venslosky are 
correctional officers at FCI Loretto who were assigned to 
supervise the commissary at the time Mack worked there.  
They were responsible for the safety and security of the 
inmates and the orderly operation of the commissary. 
 
 While Mack was at work one day, Officer Roberts 
walked up behind him and slapped him hard on the back.  
Mack asked Roberts why he had hit him, to which Roberts 
responded, “do you have a problem with what I did?”4  Mack 
said “yes,” and Roberts declared, “you’ll be looking for 
another job soon!”5  Officer Venslosky and other inmates 
witnessed this interaction and laughed.  The officers and 
inmates continued to laugh and snicker at Mack throughout 
his shift.  When Mack finished work and left the commissary, 
a fellow inmate informed him that he had an “I LOVE 
BACON” sticker affixed to the back of his shirt.  Roberts 
                                              
3 See, e.g., Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191-92 & n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (recognizing that practicing Muslims do not handle 
pork); Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 219 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(recognizing that practicing Muslims pray five times each 
day). 
4 Am. Compl. (J.A. Vol. II 56-62) ¶ 14. 
5 Id. 
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knew that Mack is Muslim and that Islam forbids the 
handling and consumption of pork.  The next day, Mack 
asked Roberts why he had slapped the offensive sticker on his 
back.  Roberts asked Mack if he had a problem with that, and 
then declared again, “don’t worry you’ll be looking for 
another job soon!”6  A few days later, while Mack was at 
work, Roberts loudly told Mack in the presence of Venslosky 
and other inmates that “there is no good Muslim, except a 
dead Muslim!”7  Venslosky and other inmates heard this 
comment and laughed.  
 
 Mack claims that the officers’ anti-Muslim harassment 
and animus created a tense work environment and caused him 
to fear that he could be harmed at work because of his 
religious beliefs.  He “continued his work assignment very 
carefully and nervously[,] not knowing whether an inmate 
commissary worker [might] act out on Defendant Roberts[’] 
statement and attempt to physically harm [him] for being 
Muslim.”8  While Mack was permitted to pray at work, the 
officers’ conduct “created a threatening [and] hostile 
environment, that literally caused [him] to change his 
behavior in that [he] would no longer pray in that area, and 
would wait until he got off work.”9 
 
                                              
6 Id. ¶ 17. 
7 Id. ¶ 18. 
8 Compl. (J.A. Vol. II 33-43) ¶ 35. 
9 Mack v. Yost, No. 3:10-cv-264, ECF No. 42 (Pl. Mem. in 
Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss), at 4.   
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 B. Mack’s Complaints to Prison Staff 
 
 Seeking redress, Mack spoke with Jeff Stephens, who 
was Roberts’ and Venslosky’s supervisor.10  Mack orally 
complained to Stephens about Roberts’ anti-Muslim conduct 
and statements, and about Venslosky’s inaction during both 
incidents.  Stephens agreed to “look into it.”11  Approximately 
one week later, Venslosky told Mack that he was being fired 
from his commissary position for “bringing in other inmates’ 
commissary slips.”12  Mack replied that this was untrue, and 
that the only reason he was being fired was because he had 
complained to Stephens. Venslosky did not respond.  
 
 Convinced that Venslosky’s reason for firing him was 
a sham, Mack located Stephens during his lunch period and 
orally complained to him about his termination.  Stephens 
again responded that he would look into it. When nothing 
came of that, Mack filed an inmate request-to-staff form 
seeking an explanation in writing for his termination.  
Stephens provided Mack with a written response from 
Venslosky asserting that Mack was “caught bringing slips in 
for inmates.”13  Mack then orally complained to the Warden, 
John Yost, during his next lunch period.  The Warden 
                                              
10 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 21. 
11 Id. ¶ 21. 
12 Id. ¶ 22.  It is unclear from the record what “bringing in 
other inmates’ commissary slips” means and why it is a 
punishable offense.  For purposes of this appeal, this 
ambiguity is irrelevant. 
13 Id. ¶ 26. 
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responded, “[w]hat do you expect me to do?”14  Finally, 
Mack filed a formal grievance.  Deputy Warden Tim Kuhn 
repeated the same reason for Mack’s termination in his 
response to Mack’s formal grievance.  Mack then filed this 
federal lawsuit.  
 
 C. Procedural History 
 
 Mack filed suit pro se against Roberts, Venslosky, 
Stephens, Warden Yost, and Deputy Warden Kuhn for 
alleged constitutional violations pursuant to Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics,15 and for violations of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).16  Among 
other things, Mack alleged that the defendants violated his 
rights under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, 
which protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”17  In particular, 
Mack claimed that he was retaliated against for seeking to 
redress his grievances, that is, for orally complaining to 
Stephens about Roberts’ and Venslosky’s anti-Muslim 
conduct.   
 
 The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure 
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                              
14 Id. ¶ 28. 
15 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing an implied private right 
of action for damages against federal officials alleged to have 
violated a person’s constitutional rights). 
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. 
17 U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 4. 
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12(b)(6).  Mack appealed, and this Court vacated and 
remanded.18  We directed the District Court to consider in the 
first instance whether an inmate’s oral complaint to prison 
staff constitutes protected activity under the First 
Amendment’s right to petition.19  We noted that “[f]iling a 
formal prison grievance clearly constitutes protected 
activity,” but acknowledged that “certain informal, oral 
complaints to prison personnel have been held to constitute 
protected activity as well.”20  We also explained that Mack’s 
allegations “clearly invite inquiry into” whether the 
defendants violated Mack’s “First Amendment right to 
practice as a Muslim,” and that Mack’s claims should not 
have been dismissed without leave to amend.21 
 
 At the direction of the District Court, Mack filed an 
amended complaint, which largely tracks his original 
complaint.  Construed liberally, Mack’s amended complaint 
raises three constitutional claims and one statutory claim: (1) 
First Amendment retaliation, invoking the Petition Clause; (2) 
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause violation; (3) Fifth 
Amendment equal protection violation; and (4) Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act violation.22  From Roberts and 
                                              
18 Mack v. Yost, 427 F. App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2011).   
19 Id. at 72. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 73. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).  The District Court properly 
construed Mack’s claim under RLUIPA, which does not 
apply to federal government actions, as a claim under RFRA, 
which does.  See Mack v. Yost, 979 F. Supp. 2d 639, 650 
(W.D. Pa. 2013) (“Because provisions under the RFRA are 
 10 
 
Venslosky only, Mack seeks back pay plus interest for each 
month since he was removed from his commissary position.  
He seeks from all defendants $75,000 each in punitive 
damages.23   
 The District Court dismissed Mack’s amended 
complaint, too, for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6).  Addressing Mack’s First Amendment retaliation 
claim, the District Court held that “[a]n oral complaint to a 
prison guard is not a petitioning for the redress of grievances 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”24 The 
Court accordingly dismissed this claim, reasoning that Mack 
“had not filed a petition with an administrative agency, 
whether by formal or informal means,” until after the alleged 
retaliation occurred.25  The District Court also rejected 
Mack’s equal protection claim because Mack had not 
identified any similarly situated individuals whom prison 
officials treated differently.26  As for Mack’s Free Exercise 
and RFRA claims, which the District Court construed as 
“potential” claims, the District Court held that the defendants 
neither intentionally nor substantially burdened Mack’s 
                                                                                                     
‘nearly identical’ to those under the RLUIPA, the Court will 
address whether Mack can assert an actionable RFRA claim.” 
(internal citations omitted)).   
23 Mack sued Stephens, Yost, and Kuhn for damages in both 
their individual and official capacities.  He has conceded, 
however, that federal sovereign immunity precludes him from 
suing the officers for damages in their official capacities.  
Mack, No. 3:10-cv-264, ECF No. 42, at 12.   
24 Mack, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 648. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 646-47. 
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religious exercise, and it accordingly dismissed these claims 
as well.27  
 
 Mack moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e).  The District Court denied that motion, 
and Mack appealed.  This Court then appointed pro bono 
counsel to represent Mack.28  
                                              
27 Id. at 650-52. 
28 We extend our gratitude to the Duke University law 
students who have done a commendable job representing 
Mack on appeal.  We also applaud Mr. Russell Taylor for his 
impressive performance representing Mack at oral argument. 
 12 
 
II. DISCUSSION29 
 
 There are many layers to this case.  First, we will 
discuss Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim and the 
Government’s corresponding defenses. With respect to this 
claim, we conclude that Mack has alleged sufficient facts to 
survive a motion to dismiss and that the defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture.  We will 
dismiss this claim, however, as to Defendants Yost and Kuhn.  
  
 Second, we will discuss Mack’s RFRA claim.  We 
conclude that (i) Mack can properly bring this claim against 
prison officers for their individual conduct, (ii) he can seek 
monetary damages from the officers, and (iii) his allegations 
sufficiently allege a substantial burden on his religious 
exercise.   
                                              
29 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de 
novo a district court’s decision dismissing a complaint.  
Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 192.  We note that “the standards of 
review for an underlying dismissal order and for the denial of 
a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order are 
functionally equivalent, because we exercise plenary review 
of the dismissal order as well as of the legal questions in the 
denial of reconsideration.”  Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 128 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
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 Third, we will turn to Mack’s claim under the Free 
Exercise Clause.  We conclude that there is no available 
remedy for Mack under this claim and we will accordingly 
dismiss it.   
 
 Finally, we will discuss Mack’s equal protection claim.  
We conclude that this claim is insufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss. 
 
 A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim 
 
  i. Mack’s First Amendment Retaliation 
Claim Against Warden Yost and Deputy Warden Kuhn 
Must Be Dismissed 
 
 Mack claims that he was retaliated against for orally 
complaining to Stephens about Roberts’ and Venslosky’s 
conduct.  While Mack brings this claim against Warden Yost 
and Deputy Warden Kuhn as well, his complaint makes it 
clear that he only spoke to these defendants after the alleged 
retaliation occurred.  There is nothing alleged from which we 
can infer that Yost and Kuhn were personally involved in any 
purported retaliation.  Because plaintiffs in a Bivens suit 
“must plead that each Government-official defendant, through 
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 
Constitution,”30 Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim 
against Yost and Kuhn must be dismissed.   
 
                                              
30 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). 
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  ii. Mack Properly Exhausted His 
Administrative Remedies as to His First Amendment 
Retaliation Claim  
 
 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires 
prisoners to exhaust any and all prison grievance remedies 
before filing suit in federal court.31  “Failure to exhaust is an 
affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.”32  
The Government contends that Mack’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim must be dismissed because Mack did not 
exhaust his administrative remedies. It concedes that Mack 
described in his formal grievance much of the alleged 
wrongdoing in this case.  Nevertheless, it argues that because 
Mack’s grievance never mentioned his oral complaint to 
Stephens about Roberts’ and Venslosky’s anti-Muslim 
conduct—the alleged protected speech that forms the basis of 
his retaliation claim—this claim was not properly exhausted.  
We find this argument unconvincing.   
 
 Under the PLRA, a grievance must be described in a 
level of detail sufficient to satisfy the prison’s standards.33  
The Government describes the Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) 
procedures as “silent or vague” regarding the level of detail 
required in a grievance.34  When this is the case, an inmate’s 
                                              
31 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
32 Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013).   
33 See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“The level of 
detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance 
procedures will vary . . . but it is the prison’s requirements . . . 
that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). 
34 Gov’t Br. 15. 
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grievance must at least “alert[] the prison to the nature of the 
wrong for which redress is sought.”35  As the Supreme Court 
has explained, “the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert 
prison officials to a problem.”36  We think Mack did just that. 
 Before beginning the formal grievance process, Mack 
submitted a form requesting a written reason for his 
termination.  In his formal grievance, Mack claimed that the 
response to his request was vague, and that he was “fired 
from [his] job for no reason.”37  He went on to explain the 
anti-Muslim harassment he endured at work.  When his 
grievance was rejected, Mack explained in his appeal that the 
prison’s proffered explanation for his termination was a 
“cover-up attempt.”38  He claimed that he was fired from his 
job for “NO real reason related to [his] work.”39   
 
 Mack clearly alerted prison officials to his principal 
allegation – i.e., that he was removed from his commissary 
position for a pretextual reason.  Even if Mack did not detail 
his allegedly protected speech, his grievance nonetheless 
notified officials that he believed he was unlawfully 
terminated from his work assignment as retaliation for 
exercising his First Amendment rights.  Exhaustion merely 
requires “inmates [to] provide enough information about the 
conduct of which they complain to allow prison officials to 
                                              
35 Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). 
36 Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. 
37 Mack v. Yost, No. 3:10-cv-264, ECF No. 38-3 (Defs.’ Mot. 
to Dismiss Am. Compl.), Ex. 1b, at 2. 
38 Id. at 8. 
39 Id. 
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take appropriate responsive measures.”40  Given this fairly 
lenient standard, and with no specific guidance from BOP 
grievance procedures, we conclude that Mack exhausted his 
administrative remedies before bringing his First Amendment 
retaliation claim. 
 
  iii. A Bivens Action Exists for Mack’s 
First Amendment Retaliation Claim 
 
 The Government next argues that Mack cannot bring a 
First Amendment retaliation claim under Bivens.  In Bivens, 
the Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied 
private action for damages against federal officers alleged to 
have violated a citizen’s [Fourth Amendment] rights.”41  
Thus, a Bivens action is a private cause of action for money 
damages implied directly from the Constitution.  The 
Supreme Court has extended Bivens to two other contexts: 
suits brought under the equal protection component of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and suits 
brought under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment.42  Although the Supreme Court has 
                                              
40 Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004). 
41 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) 
(citing Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 675-76 (“In the limited setting where Bivens does apply, 
the implied cause of action is the federal analog to suits 
brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
42 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
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never formally extended Bivens to First Amendment claims,43 
it seems to have occasionally assumed that First Amendment 
retaliation claims can proceed under Bivens.44  Our Court, 
however, has explicitly recognized a Bivens action when a 
prisoner has been retaliated against for exercising his or her 
First Amendment right to petition. 
 
 In Paton v. La Prade,45 we held that a Bivens action 
may be implied directly from the First Amendment.46  
Relying on this general principle, we held in Milhouse v. 
Carlson47 that a Bivens action was available to an inmate who 
was harassed and transferred to a less desirable prison cell 
                                              
43 See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 n.4 (2012) 
(“We have never held that Bivens extends to First 
Amendment claims.”). 
44 See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (noting 
that “the law is settled that as a general matter the First 
Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting 
an individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out,” and 
stating that “[w]hen the vengeful officer is federal, he is 
subject to an action for damages under the authority of 
Bivens”); see also George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 585 n.24 
(3d Cir. 2013) (stating that “we will proceed on the 
assumption that there is a Bivens cause of action for First 
Amendment retaliation claims” (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 
256)). 
45 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975). 
46 Id. at 870 (“[W]e believe the extension of the Bivens rule to 
violations of first amendment rights to be both justifiable and 
logical.”). 
47 652 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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location in retaliation for filing a lawsuit against prison 
officials.48  Interpreting the pro se complaint as alleging a 
violation of the First Amendment right of access to the courts, 
we explained that “[p]ersons in prison, like other individuals, 
have the right to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances.”49  This right “must be freely exercisable without 
hindrance or fear of retaliation.”50  Similarly, in Mitchell v. 
Horn,51 we held that a Bivens action was available to an 
inmate who was falsely charged with misconduct in 
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment petition 
rights.52  In light of these cases, we reject the Government’s 
plea to not “extend” Bivens to Mack’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim.  Our precedents make clear that, in this 
context, a Bivens action is already available. 
 
  iv. Mack’s Oral Complaint to Stephens 
was Constitutionally Protected 
 
 We next address whether Mack has sufficiently 
pleaded a First Amendment retaliation claim.  “A prisoner 
alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected 
conduct, (2) an adverse action taken by prison officials 
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link 
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the 
                                              
48 Id. at 373-74. 
49 Id. at 373. 
50 Id. at 374. 
51 318 F.3d 523 (3d Cir. 2003). 
52 Id. at 530-31. 
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adverse action taken against him.”53  The previous panel of 
this Court to address Mack’s retaliation claim found the latter 
two elements satisfied: adverse action in the form of loss of 
employment, and a causal connection because Mack claims 
he was fired one week after engaging in the allegedly 
protected conduct.54  The panel remanded to the District 
Court to determine whether Mack’s oral grievance to 
Stephens was constitutionally protected under the Petition 
Clause, and the District Court held that it was not.  We 
disagree.  
 
 The Petition Clause embraces a broad range of 
communications, and the availability of its protections has 
never turned on a perceived distinction between written and 
oral speech.55  Both the Free Speech Clause and the Petition 
Clause protect “personal expression” – both expression 
generally and expression directed towards the government for 
the specific purpose of asking it to right a wrong.56  In this 
context, form is secondary to content. 
                                              
53 Id. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted and 
punctuation modified). 
54 Mack, 427 F. App’x at 72-73. 
55 See, e.g., Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 
2006) (“Nothing in the First Amendment itself suggests that 
the right to petition for redress of grievances only attaches 
when the petitioning takes a certain form.”). 
56 See Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 
388 (2011) (“Beyond the political sphere, both speech and 
petition advance personal expression, although the right to 
petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the 
government seeking redress of a grievance.”). 
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 The Government concedes that some informal, oral, 
and even non-verbal expressions of grievances to the 
government are protected under the Petition Clause.57  It 
argues, however, that an oral grievance lodged by a prisoner, 
in particular, should not be entitled to constitutional 
protection.  The Government stresses that prison is a unique 
setting in which inmates and guards are in constant and often 
contentious contact with each other.  In its view, holding that 
every oral complaint by a prisoner to a prison guard is 
constitutionally protected would provide too many 
opportunities for prisoners to lodge frivolous lawsuits.   
 
 While we appreciate the Government’s concerns, we 
are not persuaded that an oral grievance should not receive 
constitutional protection solely because it is lodged by a 
prisoner as opposed to a civilian.  It is well-established that 
inmates do not relinquish their First Amendment right to 
petition by virtue of being incarcerated.58  It is also true, as 
the Government emphasizes, that an inmate only “retains 
those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with 
                                              
57 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886, 909 (1982) (boycott of merchants was protected activity 
under Petition Clause); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 
136 (1966) (silent protest at racially segregated library was 
protected activity under Petition Clause); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (peaceful march and 
demonstrations were protected activity under Petition 
Clause); Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 520-23 
(6th Cir. 2010) (business owner’s oral, informal request to 
city councilman regarding his company’s ability to park at 
city venue was protected activity under Petition Clause). 
58 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
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his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological 
objectives of the corrections system.”59  But under the facts 
alleged, there is no reason for us to think that the First 
Amendment rights Mack seeks to vindicate here are 
incompatible with his status as a prisoner. 
 
 Mack’s allegations make clear that he complained to 
Stephens for the specific purpose of seeking redress.  His 
complaint concerned a prison guard’s conduct that the prison 
itself proscribes—religious harassment.60  His complaint was 
not obscene or inappropriate.  In fact, the Government 
concedes that Mack’s oral grievance was “minimally 
disruptive and arguably valuable.”61  And Mack complained 
almost immediately after the harassment occurred, 
undermining any contention that Mack formulated some sort 
of plan to lodge a complaint in order to bring a frivolous 
lawsuit.  In short, Mack’s oral grievance sufficiently and 
timely put prison officials on notice that he was seeking 
redress, was conveyed to prison officials in a reasonable 
manner, and concerned conduct that the prison itself 
prohibits.  Under the circumstances of this case, these factors 
lead us to conclude that Mack’s oral grievance is entitled to 
constitutional protection. 
 
 Significantly, moreover, prison officials at FCI Loretto 
may have actually encouraged inmates to communicate their 
concerns orally.  BOP procedures require inmates to present 
an issue “informally to staff” before filing a formal grievance, 
                                              
59 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
60 See 28 C.F.R. § 548.15. 
61 Gov’t Br. 25.   
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and require wardens to “establish procedures to allow for the 
informal resolution of inmate complaints.”62  FCI Loretto’s 
inmate handbook explains that, “Executive Staff and 
Department Heads regularly stand mainline at the lunch meal 
and you are encouraged to bring legitimate concerns to their 
attention.”63  We can reasonably assume that this is why 
Mack approached Stephens and Yost in person during his 
lunch hour.  It would be illogical to allow prison officials to 
retaliate against Mack for his oral complaint if FCI Loretto 
encourages the type of informal resolution that Mack 
attempted. 
 
 To our knowledge, only one other circuit has 
addressed this specific issue.  In Pearson v. Welborn,64 the 
Seventh Circuit held that an inmate’s oral complaints to 
prison guards about the use of shackles in group therapy and 
the denial of yard time were constitutionally protected under 
the Petition Clause.65  The court explained that “[n]othing in 
the First Amendment itself suggests that the right to petition 
for redress of grievances only attaches when the petitioning 
takes a specific form.”66  And while “certain types of 
‘petitioning’ would be obviously inconsistent with 
                                              
62 See 28 C.F.R. 542.13(a). 
63 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, FCI Loretto 
Inmate Admission and Orientation Handbook, 14 (May 
2015), available at 
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/lor/LOR_aohandb
ook.pdf (emphasis added). 
64 471 F.3d 732. 
65 Id. at 741. 
66 Id. 
 23 
 
imprisonment (marches or group protests, for example),”67 
the inmate’s oral complaints in that case did not fall into that 
category.  We find the Seventh Circuit’s rationale to readily 
apply to the circumstances of this case.68  
 
 For these reasons, we conclude that Mack’s oral 
grievance to Stephens regarding the anti-Muslim harassment 
he endured at work constitutes protected activity under the 
First Amendment.69   
                                              
67 Id.  
68 See also Williams v. Wahner, 731 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 
2013) (“Many prisoners can explain themselves orally but not 
in writing.  They may be illiterate in English, or they may 
simply be such poor writers that they can’t convey their 
thoughts other than orally.”). 
69 The Government urges us to impose a public concern 
requirement on oral grievances in the prisoner-work context.  
In the public employment context, public employees who 
assert First Amendment free speech or right to petition claims 
against their government employers must show that their 
speech addressed a matter of public concern.  See Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-48 (1983); Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 
398-99.  We have explicitly stated, however, that the rationale 
for the public/private concern distinction in the public 
employment context does not apply in other contexts, 
including prison settings.  Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 
F.3d 274, 284 (3d Cir. 2004).  Several other circuits have held 
the same.  See, e.g., Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 795 
(7th Cir. 2010); Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 87 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
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  v. Roberts, Venslosky, and Stephens are 
Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity 
 
 The remaining question we must answer with respect 
to Mack’s First Amendment retaliation claim is whether 
Roberts, Venslosky, and Stephens are entitled to qualified 
immunity.70 “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary 
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”71  To be clearly 
established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he 
is doing violates that right.”72  “The dispositive question is 
whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 
established.”73  That is not to say that qualified immunity 
applies “unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful,” only that “in light of pre-existing law 
the unlawfulness must be apparent.”74   
 
                                              
70 Because the District Court found no First Amendment 
retaliation violation, it did not address whether the officers 
were entitled to qualified immunity.  As this issue is purely a 
question of law at this stage, we address it in the first 
instance. 
71 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
72 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
73 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
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 We have long recognized that prisoners have a right to 
be free from retaliation for exercising their First Amendment 
right to petition.  Indeed, “[r]etaliating against a prisoner for 
the exercise of [any of] his constitutional rights is 
unconstitutional.”75  Retaliatory termination is clearly 
unlawful, both inside and outside the prison context.76  The 
fact that the officers retaliated against Mack before he 
reduced his grievance to writing is inconsequential.  While 
we have never held before today that a prisoner’s oral 
grievance, in particular, is constitutionally protected, we have 
certainly never suggested that such a grievance is entitled to 
lower protection than one reduced to writing.  And there are 
myriad cases outside the prison context that make no 
distinction between oral and written grievances.77  Thus we 
have little doubt concluding that prisoners’ oral grievances 
are indeed entitled to constitutional protection.  A reasonable 
official in the prison officers’ position should therefore have 
known that retaliating against Mack for exercising his right to 
petition, whether in the form of an oral or written grievance, 
was unlawful.78  This is especially so if the prison actually 
encourages its inmates to communicate their concerns orally.   
                                              
75 Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 376. 
76 Although prisoners have no liberty or property interest in 
prison employment, James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629-30 
(3d Cir. 1989), it is unlawful to terminate a prisoner’s 
employment in retaliation for them having exercised a 
constitutional right, see Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
77 See supra note 57. 
78 See, e.g., Holzemer, 621 F.3d at 529 (“[N]o reasonable 
officer could believe that retaliation for the exercise of a First 
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 Because we conclude that Mack has sufficiently stated 
a First Amendment retaliation claim, and that the remaining 
defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, we will 
vacate the District Court’s dismissal of this claim and remand 
to the District Court for further proceedings. 
 
 B. Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 
Claim 
 
 We next address Mack’s claim that the prison officers’ 
anti-Muslim conduct violated RFRA, which prohibits the 
government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s 
exercise of religion.”79  Mack brings this claim against only 
Officers Roberts and Venslosky in their individual capacities.  
He alleges that their anti-Muslim harassment and hostility 
towards him caused him to refrain from praying at work.  
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under RFRA. 
 
  i. RFRA’s Remedial Scope 
 
 Mack’s claim raises two threshold questions: (1) 
whether RFRA is the appropriate vehicle for relief when the 
challenged government action is an official’s individual 
conduct, as opposed to a law, regulation, or policy, or conduct 
pursuant to such; and (2) whether RFRA allows a litigant to 
                                                                                                     
Amendment right is permitted when that exercise takes the 
form of speech but is not permitted when the same expression 
is written.”); Pearson, 471 F.3d at 742 (“[W]e think a 
reasonable public official in [the defendant’s] position would 
understand that retaliating against a prisoner on the basis of 
his [oral] complaints about prison conditions is unlawful.”). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
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sue a government official for money damages.  We answer 
both questions in the affirmative. 
 
 Congress enacted RFRA “in order to provide very 
broad protection for religious liberty.”80  RFRA prohibits the 
“Government” from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability,” unless the “Government” can 
“demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”81  The statute explicitly 
provides a private cause of action against the “government” 
for “appropriate relief.”82  “Government” is defined as 
“includ[ing] a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, 
and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the 
United States.”83   
 
 The plain language of RFRA establishes that a plaintiff 
may bring claims for “appropriate relief” against “persons,” 
either federal “officials” or those acting under color of federal 
law, whose individual conduct substantially burdens one’s 
religious exercise.  Nothing in the text of RFRA suggests that 
the “official” or “person” must be acting in furtherance of an 
official policy.  This interpretation is consistent with the 
                                              
80 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 
(2014). 
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). 
82 Id. § 2000bb-1(c). 
83 Id. § 2000bb-2(1) (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court’s view of RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage.”84  
According to the Court, RFRA “intru[des] at every level of 
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions 
of almost every description and regardless of subject matter,” 
and its restrictions apply to “every agency and official of the 
Federal Government[].”85  
 
 Our conclusion that RFRA permits suits against 
individual officers for their ultra vires acts is reinforced by 
the similarities between RFRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Section 1983 creates a private cause of action against 
“person[s]” acting “under color of [state law]” whose 
individual conduct violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.86  
Under § 1983, state officials or private persons acting under 
color of state law may be held liable for their personal 
unlawful conduct, irrespective of the existence or non-
existence of an unconstitutional law, regulation, or policy.  
Because RFRA’s definition of “government” tracks the 
language of § 1983, it is reasonable to assume that liability 
can be imposed similarly under both statutes.  Indeed, several 
of our sister circuits have concluded that this word choice was 
not coincidental and that Congress intended for courts to 
borrow concepts from § 1983 jurisprudence when construing 
                                              
84 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).   
85 Id.  In fact, it is this “sweeping coverage” that led the Court 
to invalidate RFRA as applied to the states for exceeding 
Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 532-34. 
86 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 29 
 
RFRA.87  As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[w]hen a 
legislature borrows an already judicially interpreted phrase 
from an old statute to use in a new statute, it is presumed that 
the legislature intends to adopt not merely the old phrase but 
the judicial construction of that phrase.”88  Under this 
presumption, RFRA, like § 1983, provides for relief from 
individual government conduct whether or not it is 
undertaken pursuant to an official rule or policy.  Thus, 
contrary to the Government’s contentions, Mack’s failure to 
challenge a prison policy or regulation does not defeat his 
RFRA claim. 
 
 We also read RFRA as providing for monetary relief 
from officers who commit unlawful conduct.89  Under 
                                              
87 See, e.g., Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 
136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) (applying § 1983 “under color of” law 
analysis to determine whether private defendant was the 
“government” for purposes of RFRA); Sutton v. Providence 
St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(same). 
88 Sutton, 192 F.3d at 834-35 (quoting Long v. Director, 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 767 F.2d 1578, 1581 
(9th Cir. 1985)). 
89 Although we have never held before today that damages 
suits are available under RFRA, we and several other circuits 
have assumed this to be the case.  See, e.g., Jama v. Esmor 
Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(assuming RFRA damages were available against corporate 
and individual defendants when reviewing attorney fee 
award); Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1996), 
cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 522 U.S. 
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RFRA’s judicial relief provision, persons whose religious 
exercise has been substantially burdened by the government 
may “obtain appropriate relief against a government.”90  The 
statute does not define “appropriate relief.”  Hence we look to 
the traditional presumption articulated in Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools91 that “any appropriate 
relief” is available unless Congress expressly indicates 
otherwise.92   
 
                                                                                                     
801, district court partially aff’d, 1998 WL 416151 (7th Cir. 
1998) (assuming that prisoner was entitled to sue prison 
officials for damages under RFRA because the statute defines 
“government” to include government employees); Brown v. 
Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538 (1st Cir. 
1995), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Martinez 
v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2010) (assuming that 
damages were available under RFRA in concluding that 
RFRA does not apply retroactively to plaintiffs’ claim for 
damages). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). 
91 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
92 Because Mack brings his RFRA claim against only Officers 
Roberts and Venslosky in their individual capacities, the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity to suits for 
damages is irrelevant here.  Cf. Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 
1198, 1210 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Davila v. 
Haynes, 136 S. Ct. 78 (2015) (“Congress did not 
unequivocally waive its sovereign immunity in passing 
RFRA.  RFRA does not therefore authorize suits for money 
damages against officers in their official capacities.”). 
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 In Franklin, the Supreme Court considered whether 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which the 
Court previously held creates an implied right of action, 
provides for damages relief.  The Court applied the 
longstanding presumption that, “absent clear direction to the 
contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to 
award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action 
brought pursuant to a federal statute.”93  “Finding no express 
congressional intent to limit the remedies available under the 
implied right of action, the Court held that compensatory 
damages were available” under Title IX.94 
 
 The same presumption applies here – more so, we 
think, because Congress expressly stated that a claimant may 
obtain “appropriate relief” against the government – the exact 
language used in Franklin.  Congress enacted RFRA one year 
after Franklin was decided and was therefore well aware that 
“appropriate relief” means what it says, and that, without 
expressly stating otherwise, all appropriate relief would be 
available.95  Of course, the relief has to be appropriate vis-à-
vis the purposes of the statute.  As we have explained, the 
                                              
93 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71.   
94 Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 288 (2011) (citing 
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73). 
95 See Availability of Money Damages Under the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act, 18 Op. O.L.C. 180, 183 (1994) 
(“Because RFRA’s reference to ‘appropriate relief’ does not 
clearly exclude money damages, there is a strong argument 
that under the Franklin standard money damages should be 
made available to RFRA plaintiffs in suits against non-
sovereign entities.”). 
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purposes of RFRA are to provide broad religious liberty 
protections.  We see no reason why a suit for money damages 
against a government official whose conduct violates RFRA 
would be inconsistent with those purposes.   
 
 Our conclusion is bolstered, again, by the similarities 
between RFRA and § 1983, which has long provided for 
money damages against state officials sued in their individual 
capacities.96  We are unmoved, however, by the similarities in 
the text of RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, which we 
have held does not provide for damages against state officials 
sued in their individual capacities.97  Although the judicial 
relief provision in RLUIPA mirrors that in RFRA,98 RLUIPA 
was enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the 
Spending Clause, thereby allowing Congress to impose 
certain conditions, such as civil liability, on the recipients of 
federal funds, such as state prison institutions.99  Because 
state officials are not direct recipients of the federal funds, 
and thus would have no notice of the conditions imposed on 
them, they cannot be held individually liable under 
RLUIPA.100  RFRA, by contrast, was enacted pursuant to 
                                              
96 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147, 150 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1971) (“Money damages may constitute 
appropriate relief in Section 1983 cases.” (citing Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 163, 187 (1961))). 
97 See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2012). 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).    
99 Sharp, 669 F.3d at 154. 
100 Id. at 154-55. 
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Congress’s powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
and thus does not implicate the same concerns.101   
 
 For these reasons, we conclude that federal officers 
who violate RFRA may be sued in their individual capacity 
for damages. 
 
  ii. Mack Has Alleged a Substantial 
Burden on His Religious     
 Exercise 
 
 We now address the merits of Mack’s RFRA claim.  
To establish a prima facie case under RFRA, Mack must 
allege that the government (1) substantially burdened (2) a 
sincere (3) religious exercise.102  The Government does not 
dispute the sincerity of Mack’s exercise of his religious 
beliefs.  Thus, the only issue is whether Mack has sufficiently 
alleged a substantial burden on his religious exercise. 
 
 Although RFRA does not explicitly define the term 
“substantial burden,” we have explained that a substantial 
burden exists where (1) “a follower is forced to choose 
                                              
101 We are also unmoved by the conclusion of one district 
court that RFRA does not provide for damages against 
individual officers because that form of relief was unavailable 
under the Supreme Court jurisprudence that RFRA sought to 
restore.  See Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 777-78 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).  As noted by the Supreme Court in Hobby 
Lobby, RFRA provides “even broader protection for religious 
liberty than was available” previously.  134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3.   
102 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006). 
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between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting 
benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus 
abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to 
receive a benefit;” or (2) “the government puts substantial 
pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior 
and to violate his beliefs.”103  
 
 Mack argues that the combination of Officer Roberts’ 
anti-Muslim harassment and Officer Venslosky’s tacit 
approval created a hostile work environment that caused him 
to stop praying at work.  We can reasonably infer from these 
allegations that Mack previously was in the practice of 
praying at work before the harassment took place.  Although 
Mack concedes that the officers did not directly command 
him to cease praying, a burden can be “substantial” even if it 
involves indirect coercion to betray one’s religious beliefs.104  
Because we think the indirect pressure the officers placed on 
Mack may very well have substantially burdened his religious 
exercise, we conclude that his allegations are sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  We will therefore vacate the 
District Court’s dismissal of Mack’s RFRA claim and remand 
to the District Court for further proceedings. 
                                              
103 Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Although Klem examined the definition of “substantial 
burden” in the context of RLUIPA, the two statutes are 
analogous for purposes of the substantial burden test. 
104 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439, 450 (1988) (“[I]ndirect coercion or penalties on the 
free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are 
subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment.”). 
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 C. Free Exercise Claim 
 
 Next, we address Mack’s claim that the prison 
officers’ anti-Muslim conduct violated his First Amendment 
right to freely exercise his religion.105  Mack seeks only 
monetary relief, asserting that he has an implied right of 
action for damages pursuant to Bivens.  But neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Court has ever extended Bivens to 
Free Exercise claims.  In view of RFRA’s broad protections 
for religious liberty, we decline to do so here. 
 
 The Supreme Court in Wilkie v. Robbins106 set forth a 
two-part framework for considering whether to extend Bivens 
to new contexts.  First, we ask whether there is an alternative 
remedial scheme available to the plaintiff and, if so, whether 
the existing scheme “convinc[es]” us to refrain from 
providing a new, freestanding damages remedy.107  If not, 
then we consider whether “special factors” counsel hesitation 
in creating a new cause of action for damages.108  “Special 
factors” typically relate to the question of who should decide 
whether and how a remedy should be provided.109  We must 
keep in mind, however, that “‘Congress is in a far better 
                                              
105 The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion.]”  U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1. 
106 551 U.S. 537 (2007).    
107 Id. at 550. 
108 Id. 
109 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983). 
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position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species 
of litigation’ against those who act on the public’s behalf.”110 
 Mack’s argument fails at step one because the 
religious liberty protections provided by RFRA strongly 
militate against creating a Bivens action for Free Exercise 
claims.  As detailed in our preceding section, RFRA provides 
Mack with a comprehensive remedial scheme for violations 
of substantial burdens on his religious exercise.  Indeed, 
“Congress enacted RFRA in order to provide greater 
protection for religious exercise than is available under the 
First Amendment.”111  Under RFRA, burdens on religious 
exercise need not be intentional, only substantial.  And, as we 
have explained, RFRA provides claimants with all 
“appropriate relief” for such violations.  Given this alternative 
remedial scheme, we can conceive no adequate justification 
for extending Bivens to Free Exercise claims.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Mack’s Free 
Exercise claim. 
 
 D. Equal Protection Claim 
 
 Finally, we address Mack’s equal protection claim 
under the Fifth Amendment.112  To state an equal protection 
                                              
110 Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 389). 
111 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859-60 (2015). 
112 Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal 
protection clause, the Supreme Court has construed the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause as containing an equal 
protection guarantee.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).  Accordingly, “Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claims are examined under the 
same principles that apply to such claims under the 
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claim, Mack must allege that he was treated differently than 
other similarly situated inmates, and that this different 
treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based 
on his membership in a protected class, such as religious 
affiliation.113   
 
 Mack did not specifically raise an equal protection 
claim in his amended complaint, though he argued in his first 
complaint that he was denied equal protection of prison 
regulations and/or policies.114  He elaborated in his opposition 
to the defendants’ motion to dismiss that he was “targeted” 
and “singled out . . . due to his faith, and that no other inmate 
who[] worked in the commissary was treated with hostility 
because of their religion.”115  On appeal, Mack contends that 
these allegations, construed liberally, support two plausible 
inferences: (1) that the defendants terminated him from his 
work assignment because of his religion, and (2) that the 
defendants harassed him because of his religion. 
 
 Even construing his pleadings liberally, we are not 
convinced that Mack has sufficiently stated a claim for 
discriminatory termination based on his religion.  His 
allegations certainly make out the claim that he was fired 
because he complained of the anti-Muslim harassment against 
him: “Plaintiff then stated . . . ‘[t]he only reason I’m being 
                                                                                                     
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 
F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001). 
113 See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294, 298 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
114 Compl. 1. 
115 Mack, No. 3:10-cv-264, ECF No. 42, at 5. 
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fired is because I spoke to [Defendant] Mr. Stevens [sic] 
about what Mr. Roberts did and said to me.’”116  But we find 
it much harder to construe his pleadings as making out the 
claim that he was fired because he is Muslim, or that the 
officers’ anti-Muslim animus played a role in their decision to 
fire him.   
 
 Mack’s discriminatory harassment claim fares no 
better.  Mack alleges two instances of discriminatory conduct 
by Officer Roberts – first placing the Islam-offensive sticker 
on his back, and then shouting that “there is no good Muslim 
except a dead Muslim.”  While these instances certainly 
provide strong evidence of Roberts’ anti-Muslim animus, 
they do not, standing alone, state an equal protection 
violation.117  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Mack’s equal protection claim.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 At first blush, this case may seem to lack merit.  But 
Mack’s allegations, taken as true, raise legitimate concerns 
about how he was treated in prison.  This case has also raised 
                                              
116 Am. Compl. ¶ 23.  See id. ¶ 35 (alleging that Roberts and 
Venslosky “retaliate[d] against [Mack] by firing him from the 
commissary job, because of plaintiff exercising his right to 
seek redress by way of (oral) grievance”). 
117 In other words, the behavior that Mack sets forth in his 
complaint – i.e., two instances of anti-Muslim harassment – 
does not force us to confront whether and to what extent 
persistent harassment may make out a claim for an equal 
protection violation.  We are confident that two instances of 
harassment are insufficient. 
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several unsettled issues about how or if a litigant such as 
Mack may obtain relief.  For reasons we have explored, we 
conclude that Mack’s First Amendment retaliation and RFRA 
claims may proceed, and his First Amendment Free Exercise 
and Fifth Amendment equal protection claims may not.  We 
will therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
Opinion. 
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Mack v. Yost, et al.,  
 
No. 14-2738 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
 I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority 
in Part II A of its opinion that Mack has stated a First 
Amendment retaliation claim against defendants Roberts and 
Venslosky.  I believe that, with regard to a retaliation claim 
made by the inmate of a prison, oral complaints should not be 
considered protected conduct under the First Amendment.  
Oral complaints, unlike written grievances, do not create a 
record.  In fact, oral complaints may generate uncertainty 
about the content, or even the existence, of the grievance.  In 
addition, a written complaint better provides notice to prison 
officials about the nature of the grievance and the individuals 
implicated in it.1  This written notice is important because, in 
the prison setting, inmates constantly interact with multiple 
prison officials, and “virtually any adverse action taken 
against a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise 
not rising to the level of a constitutional violation—can be 
characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.”2   
                                                          
1 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(letters and forms filed by inmate provided prison officials 
notice of the substantial risk that inmate faced for his safety). 
2 Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotations omitted).   
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 Drawing a line between oral, informal complaints and 
written, formal grievances reflects some of the difficulties in 
the administration of prisons and in the handling inmate 
grievances.  Congress had these concerns in mind when it 
enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which directs 
inmates to comply with the correctional institution’s policy 
on grievance resolution.3  The institution’s policy here, found 
in the Loretto inmate handbook, directs that inmates file 
written grievances; the handbook makes no mention of oral 
complaints.   
 
 As we set out above, the logic behind encouraging 
written rather than oral complaints is obvious when viewed in 
the context of effective administration of the prison grievance 
system.  The majority’s conclusion that an oral, informal 
complaint constitutes protected conduct under the First 
Amendment renders the administration of grievance 
procedures more difficult and risks vastly increasing the 
number of prisoner lawsuits involving retaliation claims.  
 
 Furthermore, our precedent is clear that written 
grievances do constitute protected conduct under the First 
Amendment.  In Milhouse, we held that the inmate stated a 
claim that he was subjected to a conspiratorially planned 
series of disciplinary actions as retaliation for initiating a civil 
rights suit against prison officials.4  In Bistrian, we concluded 
that the inmate stated a claim that prison officials confined 
him in the segregated housing unit in retaliation for written 
complaints he filed through his attorney.5  A written 
                                                          
3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). 
4 Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1981).   
5 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2012).  
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grievance protects the prisoner as well as the prison 
administration.    
 
 In conclusion, considering the policy behind the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that a grievance be in 
writing and that it comply with the correctional institution’s 
policy, along with the Loretto inmate handbook’s requirement 
that grievances be in writing, I find that these requirements 
are “legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system.”6   
 
 I consider, therefore, that it is not a violation of a 
prisoner’s First Amendment rights to require that any 
grievance that would form the basis for a retaliation claim be 
in writing and to refuse to find a retaliation claim arising from 
an oral complaint.   Thus, I would affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim.  
 
  I do, however, join the majority in its holding in Part 
II B that the allegations of the RFRA violation survive a 
motion to dismiss and that that claim should be remanded to 
the District Court.  I also join the majority in its holding in 
Part II C and D that the District Court’s dismissal of the First 
Amendment Free Exercise claim and the RLUIPA claim be 
affirmed.  
                                                          
6 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that in 
the First Amendment context  “a prison inmate retains those 
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his 
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological 
objectives of the corrections system.”). 
